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Civil Procedure. Armentrout v. Armentrout, 691 A.2d 559 (R.I.
1997). Where a request of alimony is made, the moving party is
not required to serve the defendant personally within the boarders
of this jurisdiction as jurisdiction over the defendant is continuing.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Marie Armentrout (Marie) and Luke Armentrout (Luke)
ended their marriage on May 23, 1984.1 The final divorce judg-
ment required Luke to pay fifty dollars alimony per week for a ten-
year period.2 Six years later, Luke filed a complaint in family
court to suspend his alimony obligation. The family court rendered
a written decision granting Luke's request for modification. 3 Du-
plicate originals of the decision were sent to both parties. How-
ever, the court never entered a written order memorializing its
decision. Following the family court's ruling, Luke stopped paying
alimony. 4
In early June of 1994, Marie learned that Luke, who was then
residing in Ohio, would be visiting Rhode Island to attend their
daughter's wedding. 5 On June 16, 1994, Marie filed a motion to
adjudge Luke in contempt. Marie argued that without a signed
order suspending the alimony payments, Luke was still obligated
to pay alimony. On June 17, 1994, while a guest at his daughter's
wedding in Rhode Island, Marie had Luke served personally with a
summons and a contempt motion.6
In response to his ex-wife's zealous pursuit of monetary com-
pensation, Luke entered a special appearance to contest Marie's
contempt motion.7 Luke filed his own motion to dismiss the con-
tempt proceeding as frivolous because of the court's August, 1990
decision suspending his alimony obligation. Following this filing
Marie moved in front of the court to amend her contempt motion
and asked Luke's obligation to pay alimony be made permanent.8
Luke was personally served in Ohio, within the requisite statutory
1. See Armentrout v. Armentrout, 691 A.2d 559, 560 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 560.
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time requirements, with the amended motion.9 Luke's local coun-
sel was served by mail in Rhode Island.' 0 Following service in
Ohio, Luke "entered a 'special appearance' and made a motion to
dismiss Marie's amended motion for lack of personal
jurisdiction.""
The family court reviewed Marie's motion to amend her con-
tempt claim and required her to file a new motion. 12 Marie argued
that, because Luke had sought and obtained a recision of alimony
in the family court in 1990, the jurisdiction of the court continued
over him. The family court found, however, that when Mr. Armen-
trout was served at his daughter's wedding, the service was invalid
"because Marie had served him with a contempt motion notwith-
standing the 1990 decision suspending Luke's obligation to pay ali-
mony."' 3 The family court judge believed that Marie was
attempting to reestablish alimony rather than have Luke judged in
contempt. Therefore, the court believed that personal service was
required in Rhode Island for the "new" motion and service in Ohio
was inadequate.' 4 However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
would rely heavily on Rhode Island General Laws section 15-5-
16(c)(2) for a dispositive conclusion to this procedural quandary. 15
BACKGROUND
The family court has the power to modify an alimony decree at
any time.16 Either party's establishment of residence in another
jurisdiction does not automatically terminate the family court's ju-
risdiction over the support proceeding.' 7 Furthermore, Rhode Is-
land Rule 64 A(a) of Domestic Relations Procedure provides that
the party seeking post-judgment relief must serve the party
against whom the relief is sought pursuant to Rule 4(d) and 4(e) of
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See id.; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16(c) (1956) (1996 Reenactment)
(allowing for revision to the alimony award, as alimony is need based); Ramsbot-
tom v. Ramsbottom, 542 A.2d 1098, 1100 (R.I. 1988). In entertaining a motion to
amend, the moving party must show a "substantial change in circumstances."
Wrobleski v. Wrobleski, 653 A.2d 732, 734 (R.I. 1995).
15. See Armentrout, 691 A.2d at 561 (citing R.I. Domestic Rel. P. 64A(a).
16. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16(c)(2) (1956).
17. See Porter v. Porter, 684 A.2d 259, 262 (R.I. 1996).
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the Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure.18 Absent a procedure to
terminate jurisdiction, jurisdiction is not extinguished unless done
so by the family court. 19
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that after the alimony
decree had been entered, the family court had continuing jurisdic-
tion to modify an alimony order. This jurisdiction continues even
when one of the parties is absent from the jurisdiction. 20 There-
fore, serving Luke in Ohio was sufficient to compel appearance
before the court for an alimony modification. 21 Furthermore, the
service of Luke for contempt in Rhode Island during his daughter's
wedding in 1994 was not necessary because the court already had
jurisdiction over the matter.22
In interpreting section 15-5-16 of the Rhode Island General
Laws 23 as allowing jurisdiction to continue after the order of the
18. See Armentrout, 691 A.2d at 561 (citing R.I. R. Domestic Rel. P. 64A(a)).
19. See Porter, 684 A.2d at 262.
20. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16(c)(2) (1956)).
21. See id.
22. See id. The Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure depart from the long
established test set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), which established the minimum-contacts test. Mr. Armentrout was most
likely lacking the requisite-minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island,
given that he only returned briefly to attend his daughter's wedding. However, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court in Calcagno v. Calcagno, 391 A.2d 79, 82 (R.I. 1978),
established that the family court retains jurisdiction to enforce and modify judg-
ments. See id. Additionally, the minimum-contacts test was formally discarded in
child-custody cases in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984).
See also Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B
(1994) (facilitating the enforcement of child-support orders among states in order
to discourage interstate controversies over child support and avoid jurisdictional
competition among state courts in establishing child-support orders).
23. Rhode Island General Laws section 15-5-16 states in part:
(c)(1) For the purposes of this section, alimony shall be construed as pay-
ments for the support or maintenance of either the husband or the wife.
(2) Alimony is designed to provide support for a spouse for a reasonable
length of time to enable the recipient to become financially independent
and self sufficient. Provided, however, that the court may award alimony
for an indefinite period of time when it is appropriate in the discretion of
the court based upon the factors set forth in subdivision (b)(2)(ii)(B). After
a decree for alimony has entered, the court may from time to time upon
the petition of either party review and alter its decree relative to the
amount of the alimony and the payment thereof, and may make any de-
cree relative thereto which it might have made in the original suit. The
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court has been entered, the court analogized section 15-5-16 with
the rule handed down in Porter v. Porter which dealt with child
support.24 In Porter, the court held that the family court's jurisdic-
tion was not ended by the parties' establishing residence in other
jurisdictions.25 Therefore, absent a factor terminating jurisdiction,
the family court retains jurisdiction pursuant to section 15-5-
16(c)(2) of the Rhode Island General Laws. 28
CONCLUSION
The court in Armentrout solidified the long-established rule re-
garding jurisdiction in domestic relations allowing the family
court's jurisdiction to extend to nonresident parties. In analogiz-
ing the procedure in alimony disputes to the procedure used in cus-
tody disputes, the court squarely aligned itself behind Rhode
Island case law27 and statutory law.28 Furthermore, in extending
this rationale to domestic relations, the court further streamlined
the procedural process by breaking down unnecessary hurdles that
hinder expedient resolution to divorce litigation.
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decree may be made retroactive in the court's discretion to the date that
the court finds that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred;
provided however, the court shall set forth in its decision the specific find-
ings of fact which show a substantial change in circumstances and upon
which findings of facts the court has decided to make the decree retroac-
tive. Nothing herein provided shall affect the power of the court as her-
etoafter provided by law to alter, amend, or annul any order of alimony
heretofore entered. Upon the remarriage of the spouse who is receiving
alimony, the obligation to pay alimony shall automatically terminate at
once.
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-5-16(c)(1), (2) (1956) (1996 Reenactment).
24. See Armentrout, 691 A.2d at 561 (citing Porter v. Porter, 684 A.2d 259, 261
(R.I. 1996)).
25. Porter, 684 A.2d at 263 (holding that absence from the jurisdiction to avoid
enforcement would undermine the effectuation of domestic-relations decisions and
citing the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Act).
26. Armentrout, 691 A.2d at 561 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16(c)(2).
27. See Calcagno v. Calcagno, 391 A.2d 79, 82 (R.I. 1978).
28. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16(c)(2) (1956) (1996 Reenactment).
